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THE LEGALIZATION OF THE PRESIDENCY: A TWENTY-FIVE 
YEAR WATERGATE RETROSPECTIVE 
MICHAEL A. FITTS
* 
I s  h istory destiny? Are those who i gnore i t ,  as has often been prophes ized, 
condemned to repeat it? 
As Americans we benefit enom1ously from our exploration, even obses­
sion, with the past. The rewards flowing from such retrospective searches are 
partly i nstrumental. H i storical i nqui ry helps us better appreciate the potential 
ups ides as well as p itfal ls of our current choices. B ut even if the past  is neither 
a repli c a  of, nor a moral precedent for, the future, A merican h istory necessari ly 
shapes our personal and collective understanding of the present. Our current 
debates are deeply effected by our retrospecti ve understandi ng of the meani n g  
of what preceded us. 
The events surrounding Watergate poignantly serve both roles for separa­
tion of powers enthusiasts. Indeed, few, if any, epi sodes in our separation of 
powers h istory capture the publ ic  and academic i magination to the same de­
gree. Watergate has also framed much of the subsequent debate over the 
proper role of the presi dency,  especial ly  for longitudi n ally challenged baby 
boomers, who make up much of the current crop of legal academics .  For us, 
thi s  period was a defining moment in our understanding of the proper exercise 
and potential abuse of presi dential authority. I t  also underscored the necessity 
for the rule of law in controll ing that most individual, and personal, of institu­
tions-the presi dency. 1 
With this picture of executive abuse frozen i n  our collective m ind, the 
Watergate lessons have since resulted i n, or at least provi de a theoretical ra­
tionalization for, much legislation subjecting the presi dency to greater legal 
*Ro bert G. Fu ller . Jr . , Professor of Law,  Uni vers ity of Pennsy lvania Schoo l of Law. The author 
woul d like to thank Cha im Ste m for his e xcellent research ass istance in the preparat ion of th is 
art icle.  
l. In dee d, the author spent an unsett li ng even ing in a Harvar d dorm during the so-calle d 
Satur day N ight Massacre. The reason : the dorm Master, the Deputy Watergate Prosecutor, as ­
sume d the pos it ion of Acting Special Prosecutor that even ing by v irtue of Arch ibal d Co x's invo l­
untary departure. As the FBI SU!Toun de d  the Spec ial Prosecutor's of fices i n  Washington . we al l  
imagine d, by v irtue of the success ion , that  our dorm was ne xt .  In this sense, Watergate may hav e 
bee n  the one t ime in our generat iona l  h istory when we actually imag ine d the possi bi l i ty of arme d 
confiict  over the control of the Unite d States government .  
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regul ation. The Independent Counsel Statute,2 the War Po\vers Resolution,' 
and the Congressional Budget and I mpoundment Control Act o f  1974,4 were 
certainly the most famous legislative reactions to the events of ·watergate. 
Each ensured greater part ic ipation o f  i nsti tutions outside the president's formal 
control i n  the execution of an important presidential  function. Beyond these 
conspicuous i nnovations, the reform phi l osophy that grew out of Watergate 
served as a just i fication for a variety of other legal  changes such as the passage 
of the Freedom of fnformation Act (FOIA),5 the Government i n  the Sunshine 
Act (GSA),6 and the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA),7 as well as the 
rei n vigoration of Congressional oversight.� Even to the present clay, debates 
over structural reform, such as the scope of executive priv ilege and access to 
OMB and commissi on documents and deliberations,9 are l argel y  shaped by ar­
guments originally advanced in favor of these earlier legislative reforms. 
Taken together, these legal changes have served to open up the operation of 
the presidency to greater pub l i c  oversight, subj ected the presidency to legal 
checks by other branches or i nsti tutions of government and, more general ly, 
i mposed nll e  of l aw principles to more and more types of presidential decision 
m aking. 
Indeed, the i mpact of Watergate obviously extends beyond these additions 
to the United States Code. Viewed broadly, the consequences of this episode 
must be understood to encompass the transformation in expectations among 
e l i te actors, the publ ic ,  and the med i a  about how the president should oper­
ate.10 Today, the public presumes that the Chief Executive and his staff should 
act openly, and that presidenti a l  po l ic ies should be achieved through greater 
consultation w i th coordinate inst itutions in government.'' 
2 .  Ethics in Government A ct of 1 978 co dif ie d as a men de d  28 U .S .  C .  §§ 591 -98 ( 1994). 
3. 50 U.S .C .  s§ 1 541 -48 (1994). 
4. Pu b. L. No. 93-344 . 88 Stat. 2 97 ( co dif ie d as amen de d  in s cattere d se ct io ns of 2 U . S . C .  
an d 31 U.S .C . ). 
5 .  5 U.S .C .  §552 (1994). 
6. 5 U. S .C .  § 552b (1994). 
7 .  5 U.S . C .  App 2. § l ( 1994). 
8 .  Ea ch chan ge fa cil itate s con gress ional  part icipat ion  in t he de cis ion s of t he e xe cutive 
bran ch t hrou gh control over informat ion, rather t han forma l  l e ga l  interven t io n. See Matthew D .  
McCub bins & T homas S chwa nz, Congressional O'.'ersight Overlooked: Police Patrols Versus 
Fire Alarms, 28 AM. J. P OL. S CI. 165 ( 1984). T hese so- ca lle d  "fire a la rms " ensure t hat intereste d 
group s, t he pu bli c, an d Co ngres s  w il l  be alerte d to future Exe cut ive bran ch p la ns ,  an d, as a matter 
of pol it ical ne cess ity , w ill be consu lte d more often .  See Lou is Fis her ,  The Legislative Ve/0: In­
validated, It Survives, 56 LAW & CONTEMP. P ROBS. 27 3 (1993). 
9. See Susan Low Blo ch, Cleaning Up the Legal Debris Left in the Wake of Whitewater, 4 3  
S T. LOUIS U. L. J .  77 9 ( 1 999). 
10 .  See No rma n J. O mste in ,  Doing Congress 's Dirty Work, 86 G EO. L. J. 2179, 2] 83 ( 1 998). 
II. In other wor ds. whether or not the pres ident  has a le ga l right to e n ga ge in ce na in typ es 
of a ct ions . in our p ost-Wat erga te worl d, he is oft en e xpe cte d to do so open ly ,  wit h consu ltat ion of 
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Whi le sympathetic to many of these changes. this art ic le seeks to place the 
recei ved wisdom in context, showing how our col l ective v ision of the presi ­
dency, crystal l ized i n  and by Watergate, may need to be mod i fied,  or at least 
updated. As the nature and functions of the presidency have evolved over the 
years, we have begun to better understand the problems and legal complexity 
of the modern presidency.  B ecause of the pecul i ar role and vulnerabi li ty of  
the modern plebisc i tary presidency, I argue. these restrictions and expectat ions 
can tend. in at l e ast some cases, to disrupt the del icate moral authority presi ­
dents must draw o n  t o  d o  their job. 
Needless to say, there is an intentionally provocative, perhaps even mis­
chievous, quality to this claim.  How c an forcing the President to be open 
about his activ ities and subject to the rul e  of  law undermine his authority, or at 
least undermine h is  proper authority? Obviously, in most cases, it does not. 
Let me, at the outset, state the obvious: most of these changes were benefi c i al 
and necessary. I am not calling for their  repeal . Viewed systematically, how­
ever, their compl icated and sometimes burdensome i mpact on the proper func­
t ions of  the presidency needs to be recognized. In this sense, there i s  a connec­
tion between the legalization and openness of the modern presidency and at 
least some aspects of i ts polit ical weakness. I f, as Tom W icker argued, Water­
gate made l i berals understand the problems of the i mperial presidency, 12 the 
reforms of Watergate have underscored for l iberal and conservatives alike 
some of  the problems of  the modem presidency.  A lthough I am not suggesting 
repeal of these restr ictions, we need to appreci ate the difficulties they raise for 
any i nhabitant of the office even if he is trying to pe1jorm his job properly, and 
the peculi ar abi li t ies it demands of any modern president who must deal w i th 
them .  
T o  accomp l ish this task, I w i l l  cover with a broad brush several legal top­
ics that others i n  this symposium explore in far greater detai l .  The reason for 
this admittedly superfi c i al treatment: the systemic quality of the project.  
Whi le scholars usually focus on the legal i mpl ic at ions of i nd i v idual l aws and 
individual administrations, I wish to explore the broader polit ical  question of 
how the presidency, over time, is able to pursue and implement appropriate 
national policy.  Looking at i ndividual legal doctrines and presidents may miss 
part of this dynamic effect.  The generality of the analysis also has an added 
benefit; quite candidly, it avoids an extended discussion of i nd i v i dual presi­
dents, which can cloud the broader structural debate as readers react positively 
or negatively to a discussion of their favorite president. 
Part I of the article summarizes, in the context  of general separation of  
powers jurisprudence, what are generally percei ved to  be the  central lessons of  
the appropriate actors. 
12. See generally Tom Wicker, is the Restomrion of Public Confi'dence Possible in CRISIS IN 
CONFIDEi\CE: THE li'v!PACT OF WATERGATE (Donald \V. Harward eel., 1974). 
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Watergate and the legal responses to those experiences. Part I I  describes some 
of the changes in the nature of presidential power that have occurred si nce 
Watergate. Part Ili then explores how these changes might  lead us to rethink 
our approach to, or at least attitude toward, the presidency and the perform­
ance of i ts inhabitants. The conclusion discusses some limitations of the 
analysis, as wel l  as comments briefly on the Monica Lewinsky episode, which 
has u nfolded since this article w as first drafted. 
I .  THE LESSONS OF WATERGATE 
As numerous scholars have observed, the Framers established a compli­
cated scheme of checks and b al ances in order to ensure that government ini­
tiatives were tested against the normative vision as wel l  as political w i l l  of dif­
ferent groups in society. 13 This presumption against action ensured that 
government was u n likely ever to be seized by any one faction . 14 For, in this 
system, no one institution or branch of government spoke for the people; in­
stead, the people were represented through the interplay of all  the different 
branches, in pursuit of a elaborate form of deliberative democracy.  15 
The presidency, however, has long occupied an unusu al  p l ace within this 
legal hierarchy. Under the formal structure of the Constitution, the presidency 
serves as merely one part of a constel l ation of representative institutions. B y  
rejecting a p arliamentary system, and making presidential election i ndirect, the 
framers envisioned the presidency as simply one part of the constitutional 
whole, certainly not as the representative of the people. Indeed, it w as not 
supposed or expected to be the most powerful one at that. Mcny of the presi­
dent's formal powers that legal academics explore, such as v etoin g  legislation,  
are reactive, a check on w h at w as originally viewed as the most p owerful and 
potentially dangerous institution, Congress.16 
Not surprisingly, the traditional political science literatu re on the presi­
dency reflected this picture of an e lite office of limited powers. In  the c l assic 
work of Richard Neudstadt, the u ltimate power of the pt·esident w as simply his 
ability to cajole the dispersed e lites i n  Washington to take action,  that  is ,  in 
Neudstadt's now famous words, "the power to persuade." n Informal moral 
authority was necessarily an i mportant, if not the important, i n gredient of its 
influence. 
13. See. e.g., ALPHEUS THOMAS MASON & DONALD GRIER STEPHENSON, JR., A MERICAN 
CONS TITUTIONAL LAW: INTRODUCTORY ESSAYS AND SELECTED CASES 95-97 (II '11 e d. 1996). 
14. /d. 
15. See JOSEPH M. BESSETTE, THE MILD VOICE OF REASON; DELIBERATIVE DEM OCRACY 
AND AM ERICAN NATIONAL GOVERNMENT (1994). 
16. MASON & STEPHENSON, supra note 13, at 96. 
17. RICHARD E. NEUSTADT, PRESIDENTIAL POWER: THE POLICIES OF LEADERSHIP FROM 
FOR TO CARTER I 0 ( 1980). 
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Like many architect's original drawings, however, the subsequent opera­
tion of the Constitution revealed potential deficiencies in the original plan. 
Given the responsibil ities of regu lating a modern New Deal and post New 
Deal economy, and guiding a nation in the difficult waters of international  af­
fairs, the need for govemment leadership was increasingly apparent. The sin­
gularity and vis ib i l ity of the Presidency natural ly led the public and other ac­
tors in government to look to it to formulate government pol icy in a more 
coherent fashion than the separate pieces of govemment individual ly. As a re­
sult, during the Twentieth Century, presidents and an expanded White House 
office have increasingly overseen the government bureaucracy, initiated the 
passage of a full legislative program in Congress, and exercised greater leader­
ship of U.S. pol icy abroad. Is 
These changes , which have u lt imately depended on the president ' s  claim 
to informal political support, have occurred with Democrats as well as Repub­
l icans at the helm, with the additional help of what can only be described as 
dynamic constitutional interpretation by the Court.I9 Ultimately, the process 
culminated in the development of what political scientists have described as 
"the modern presidency, "  which i s  said to have begun with Roosevelt and 
continued to the present day?0 The normative vision of a modern presidency 
was orig inall y  championed by l iberals, who saw thi s  as the main source for in­
novation in the society , but l ater found support across the polit ical spectrum.  
Despite these benefits, the singularity and power of  the presidency has  a l ­
ways been a major source of concern, as the Framers originally feared. To the 
extent the president is the formulator as well as the executor of policies, ulti­
mate authority is  vested effectively in one person. In other words, without the 
division of legis lative and executive functions, there i s ,  in effect, no veil of ig­
norance i mposed on the policy decis ion maker;2 I a president can make gov­
emment decis ions that c learly i mpli cate h is  own personal and political interest 
with no external check. In extreme cases, as Montesquieu said, "when the 
legislative and executive powers are united in the same person, or in the same 
body of magistrates; there can be no l iberty .... "22 
Watergate revealed that this problem was more than j ust theoretical .  The 
18. MARTIN SHAPIRO & ROCCO J .  TAESOLIWI, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 161-63 
(S'h ed. 1979). 
I 9. See BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE l: FOUNDATIONS ( 1991 ); Cass R. Sunstein, 
Constitutionalism Ajter The New Deal, l 0 I HARV. L. REV. 421 ( 1987); Cass R. Sunstein, An 
Eighteelllh Century Presidency in a T1venty-First Century World, 48 ARK. L. REV. I ( 1994 ). 
20. See NEUSTADT, supra note 18; THOMAS E. CRONIN, THE STATE OF THE PRESIDENCY 
(2d ed. 1980); CLINTON ROSSITER, THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY ( 1956). 
21. See Michael A. Fitts, Can Ignorance Be Bliss? lmpCJfect lnj(mnation as a Positive In­
fluence in Polilicalfnstitlllions, 88 MICH. L. REV. 917 ( 1990). 
22. MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS 151 (Thomas Nugent trans., Hafner Press 
1949) 
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executive abuses ex posed by the scandal reflected a cons i stent d i s regard for 
the rule of law by Ni xon and the White House staff. In other words .  members 
of the Nixon ad mini stration systematically confused their personal and state 
i nterests .23 As Arthur M. Schlesi nger, Jr. summarized the received \vi sdom at 
the time, "pres idential primacy. so indispensable to the political order, has 
turned into presidential supremacy . The consti tutional pres i dency . . .  has be­
come the i mperial presidency and threatens to become the revolutionary presi­
dency .''24 These perverse incentives were poignantly exposed i n  Nixon's fa­
mous declaration on the pres ident's place i n  separation of powers 
confrontations: "When the Pres ident does i t ," Nixon later remarked, "that 
means i ts not il legal . "25 
With thi s  image frozen i nto the American psyche, Watergate l ed to a se­
r ies of legal reforms as well as changed expectations as to how the presi dency 
shoul d  operate. B y  "led" I mean that these changes either occurred i n  the wake 
of Watergate, or the events of Watergate were offered as one of the rationales 
for the changes . 
Under this loose standard of causation, two types of l egal reforms can be 
said to have developed out of Watergate. The first were the substantiv e  legal 
restrictions that ensured the pres i dent could not act w ithout sharing decis ion 
making with other actors . Thi s category i ncludes, among others ,  the Im­
poundment Act,26 the War Powers Resolution,27 the appointments procedures 
contained in the I ndependent Counsel Act,28 the pol i tical insulation of the FBI ,  
Treasury, and Department of Justice; and campaign reforms and ethics restric­
tions i ncluded i n  the Ethics in Government Act. 29 
A second series of changes opened up the presidency and government to 
greater outside scruti ny: the Freedom of I n formation Act (FOIA);30 the Gov­
ernment i n  the Sunshi ne Act (GSA);31 the Federal Advisory Committee Act 
23. Wh il e t he underly ing ev ent may hav e  been a "t wo bit burglary ," t he su bseq u ent cov er ­
u p  and th e rela ted ex ecu tiv e  a bu se s  it revea led ,  r eflect ed a sys t ema tic d isregard fo r th e rule of la w 
by Nixon and hi s Whi te House aids. To pro tect t he il l egal a ct iv iti es,  the pres id ent and me mb ers 
of th e Whit e Hou s e  i mproperly in terv ened in to D epart ment of Just ice, Depart ment  of Treasury, 
and C entral Int el lig en ce investigations :  t hus manipulated gov ern ment po wer to rais e  ca mpa ign 
contribut ions. ass ert ed Ex ecutiv e  priv ile g e  for do cu ments and it ems wit h  t he so le purpos e of 
h id ing illega l  condu ct. See generallv LEON FRIEDMAN & WILLIAM LEVANTROSSER. WA� 
TERGATE AND AFTERWARD ( 1992). 
24. ARTHUR M .  SCHLESINGER, JR., THE IMPERIAL PRES IDENCY 299 ( 1973). 
25. Nixon: A President ivfay Violate the Law U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP . . M ay 30, 1977, at 
65 (in terv iew wit h  Dav id Fro st). 
26. See supm n o te 4. 
27. See supm not e 3. 
28. See supra note 2 .  
29. !d. 
30. See supm not e 5. 
3 I. See supm note 6. 
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(FACA):'=' Whistleb lower protections:'' j udic ial and pol it ical  l imi tations on 
executive and attorney-cl ient privi lege:11 creation of the Congressional Budget 
Office and expansion of congressional oversight;35 and, of cour se, the i nde­
pendent counsel provis ions in The Ethics in Government Act.36 Al l of these 
changes , along w ith changed norms about how the president should operate. 
subjected the presidency to greater legal standards and oversight. 
II. POLITICAL CHANGES AFTE R Wi\. TEGATE 
While there are strong arguments to be made on behalf of each of these 
changes , the presidency has evolved s i nce Watergate, lessening at l east some 
of the concerns about presidential overreaching and the l ikelihood of another 
armageddon. In particular, four separate polit ical developments have served to 
diminish the President's "natural" level of pol itical support, while, at the same 
time, i ncreasing his susceptibi l ity to external pol itical critic ism and legal over­
sight. 
First, and most importantly ,  the singularity of the presidency has turned 
out to be a source of weakness as well as i nformal political power. The as­
sumption had always been that the presidency was a powerful position largely 
because all of i ts i nfluence was focused i n  a s ingle person. That gave it the 
abi lity to command the airwaves, control the bureaucratic and political agenda, 
and outmaneuver other institutions, especial ly Congress, as the rational choice 
l iterature i s  forever tel l ing us. 37 That was a major source of fear regarding its 
overreach ing. 
On the other hand, in  recent years, we have seen that the individual i ty and 
singularity of the presi dency ,  that is, embodying an i nstitution in a s ingle per­
son, can be a source of pol itical weakness as wel l .  As an individual , the presi­
dent lacks some political advantages enjoyed by a multi-member i nstitution 
such as Congress, which can avoid confronting  i ssues because of its committee 
structure and change positions without serious  pol itical retribution over t ime; 
that i s  what democratic institutions are supposed to do. As an  i nstitution em­
bodied i n  a s ingle person, in contrast, the pres ident is often expected to have a 
position on al l  i ssues, to personally resolve all conflicts, and not to change his 
position i n  response to pol itical events, or else he is said to lack moral convic-
32. See supra note 7. 
33. Whistle Blower Act of 1989.5 U.SC §§ 1211-22,3352 (1994). 
34. United States v. Nixon. 418 U.S. 683, 703-16 ( 1974). 
35. 2 u.s.c s 602 (1994). 
36. See supra note 2. 
37. See TeiTY Moe, Presidents. !nsrirlllions. and Theon·, in RESEARCHING THE PRESIDENCY: 
VITAL QUESTIONS, NEW APPROACHES 337 (George C Edwards. I I I  ct a!. eels., 1993); Michael 
Fitts & Robert Inman, Controlling Congress: Prl'sidemiol Influence in Domestic Fiscal PolicY. in 
RESEM.ZCHING THE PRESIDENCY 289 ( 1992) 
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tions.�8 That i s  what pol itical leaders are supposed to do . Needless to say, the 
public also tends to hold the President more responsible for most government 
outcomes , good or bad. 
What are the pol it ical consequences of these expectations? As Stephen 
Hess has said, Americans "always have wanted their president to be something 
bigger than l ife."39 In  other words, "it i s  not just an  office of  i ncredible power 
but a breeding ground of i ndestructible myth . "40 In the modern world with in­
stant visibi l i ty and substantial ideological division in the publ ic, it can be diffi­
cult for one person to fulfil l  that role successful ly.41 The expectations  are high, 
often too high. Poli tical scientists have a term for this weakness :  i ts cal led the 
I 'd 41 persona pres1 ency. -
A second unforeseen chal lenge modern presidents must confront has been 
the transformation of political parties.43 In their  purist form parties can be po­
l i tical organizations that enable leaders to effectively galvanize the publ ic  and 
garner support among government officials. As Justice J ac kson stated in 
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v .  Sawyer,44 political parties are "a significant 
extraconstitutional supplement to real executive power."45 Their  much de­
bated transformation i n  recent years has compl icated the president ' s  role  or­
ganizationally, since he lac ks a standing party apparatus on which to rely. 
More importantly, the decl ine of reflexive party identification i n  the general 
public means that ideology, rather than party affi l iation, is a more frequent 
source of popular evaluation in today' s political environment.46 As a result the 
president is more l ikely to be subject to a population that continually asks what 
38 . M ic hael A. Fitts , The Paradox of Power in the Modem State: Why a Unital)', Central­
i;ed Presidency May Nut Exhibit Effective or Legitimme Leadership, 144 U .  PA. L. REV. 8 27 
( 1996). See also THOMAS E. CRONIN & MICHAEL A. GENOVESE, THE PARADOXES OF THE 
AM ERICAN PRESIDENCY ( 1998 ). T his an aly s is re flects to some e xtent t he com p ar at ive l aw in ­
s ig ht t hat central ized re gimes can be more u nst able in a pol it ic ally d iverse and fr ac t ion al ized so ­
c iety.  See AREND LJJPHART, DEM OCRACY IN PLURAL SOCIETIES: A COMPARATIVE EX­
PLORATION (1977); Jon at han Zaslo ff, The Tyranny of Madison. 44 U C LA L. REV. 795 ( 1997). 
39 . Al ison M itc hel l ,  Campaign Trail or Carden Path J NY. TIMES, Ju ly ,  2, 1995 at E5, 
(quo tin g Ste p hen Hess, Broo kings Ins t itut ion ). 
40 . ROSSITER supra, note 20 , at 81. 
4 1 . As Je ffrey Tul is has ob served, if "power and aut hor ity are conferred d irec tl y  by the peo ­
ple ," t he "pres iden t[) mus t con tinu al ly cr aft r hetoric t hat appe al s to [his ] popu hu· aud ience ." Jef­
frey K. Tul is ,  The Two Constitutional Presidencies, in THE PRESIDENCY AND THE POLITICAL 
SYSTEM 1 13- 14 ( M ic hael Nel son ed . 5 'h e d .  1998). See also JEFFREY TULIS, THE RHETORICAL 
PRESIDENCY ( 1987) 
42. THEODORE J .  LOW!, THE PERSONAL PRESIDENT: POWER INVESTED, PROMISE UN­
FULFILLED ( 1985). 
43. See JOHN ALDRICH, WHY PARTIES: THE ORIGIN t\ND TRANSFORMATION OF POLITICAL 
PARTIES IN AMERICA ( l 995)(discus s in g  evo lu t ion and c han ge in mode m pol it ic al p art ie s). 
44 . 343 U.S. 579 ( 1952). 
45. /d. at 654. 
46. See ALDRICH. Sllpra no te 43, at 13. 
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have you done for me lately.47 As one political review recently observed, in 
the absence of traditional parties, presidents "lack[] a firm popular base . . .  
[andj are much more vulnerable than their predecessors were to pol i t ical at­
tack, especially media criticism."4� Presidents can galvanize support on ideo­
logical grounds on a given i ssue but it can be more difficult, all things being 
equal. for the president to achieve his policy objectives. Indeed, one recent 
study of the U.S. political system described this process as "revolving 
gridlock,"49 as each branch of government is incapable of overcoming the su­
permajority hurdles established in our governmental system. 
The third political change effect ing the presidency is ,  paradoxically, the 
decline of conununism, which has diminished the president's international 
role .  Traditionally, presidents have rel ied on a socially agreed on external en­
emy, namely communism, to rally domestic support and insulate themselves 
from some domestic criticism. Indeed, one prominent legal commentator titled 
a famous article, written before the fall of communism, "Why the President 
(Almost) Always Wins in Foreign Affairs."50 With the dec line of communism, 
however, the President' s  abil i ty to invoke and trade on this  political agenda 
has diminished. Presidents can always rally the country when soldiers are in 
harm' s way, but the natural level of agreement on external enern.ies has de­
c lined. Some observers even view foreign affairs today as s imp ly an extension 
of internal domestic polit ics. This development led Clinton to comment quite 
candidly one day that he envied his predecessors because they "had an en­
emy", 51 though, in l ight of recent events, i t  is important to note he presumably 
meant the right type of enemy. Its no coincidence, we can assume, that the day 
his grand jury testimony was released to the publ ic, Clinton delivered a major 
speech proclai ming that the country was facing an international economic cri­
sis the likes of which we had not seen in the last 50 years- the length of the 
cold war.52 
Finally, the rise of a diverse and hypercritical media, which is a conse­
quence of increased market competition as well as changed cultural norms af-
47. In law and economics vernacular, there can be a type of principal agency problem 
where the agent is not given sufficient "slack" for optimal performance. 
48. Benjamin Ginsberg et al., The Presidency, Social Forces, and Interest Groups: Why 
Presidents Can No Longer Govern in THE PRESIDENCY AND THE POLITICAL SYSTEM 358, 371 
(Michael Nelson ed., 5'11 cd. 1998) 
49. See David W. BRADY & CRAIG VOLDEN, REVOLVING GRIDLOCK ( 1998) 
50. Harold Hongju Koh, Why the President (Almost) Always Win In Foreign Aflairs, 97 
YALE LJ. 1255 (1988). 
51. Richard Reeves, Why C/imon Wishes He Were .IFK, WASHINGTON MONTHLY, Septem­
ber 27, 1995. at 16 . 
52. Jim Landers, Clinton Urges U.S. Aid to Fight CurrencY Crisis. DALLAS MORNING 
NEWS. Sept. 15, 1998, at A l. 
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ter Watergate, has impacted upon the presidency disproportionately.53 In the­
ory, the singularity of the modern presidency endows it with a unique abil ity to 
dominate the press and airwaves . Now days, the breadth and competiti veness 
of the press not only l imits that i nf luence, but also means that the president is 
the most likely institution to be the subject of press scrutiny and criticism. In 
an era where every institution and faction is trying to manage i nformation 
about their activities and position, 54 wholesale exposure has a downside politi­
cal cost.55 
What are the consequence of all of these political and social develop­
ments? They have contributed to the difficulties modern presidents have in 
garnering informal political support as well as controlling the political agenda, 
which are i mportant ingredients of their influence. In other words, on average, 
with emphasis on the word average, presidents tend to be politically weaker 
than we otherwise might have expected, at least after they have served as 
president for any length of time. "The decline in presidential popularity," one 
study of modern presidents concluded, "is one of the most well documented 
trends in recent American politics."56 Indeed, there is a standard pattern for 
modern presidents; they have very low approval ratings after they have served 
as president for one or two years, with the average approval rating of presi­
dents consistently declining since 1965.57 One reason: the president 's  exercise 
of power, articulation of public positions, and exposure to intense scrutiny i n  
today's environment can tend to undermine public support and confidence. A s  
one study concluded, "active presidents are not supported i n  the polls; popular 
presidents win more but general ly  ask less."58 
Of course, these problems do not suggest the modern presidency is weak 
in comparison to Congress or on some absolute level. As the single most visi­
ble and powerful actor in Washington, with control over the bureaucracy and 
discretion in international affairs, the president has substantial legal, bureau­
cratic, and political resources at his command. The point is rather that political 
changes since Watergate have limited the presidents infl uence more than we 
might of original ly expected. The fear of a tyrannical presidency, overreach­
ing the republic and dictating the agenda, is less obvious than it was in 1973. 
53 . For a discussion of the increasing impact of the press on political behavior, see JOSEPH 
CAPELLA & KATHLEEN JAMIESON, SPIRAL OF CYNICISM: THE PRESS AND THE PUBLIC GOOD 
(1997); KATHLEEN HALL JAMIESON, DIRTY POLITICS (1992); THOMAS PATTERSON, OUT Of 
ORDER (1993). See also Mathew Baum and Samuel Kernel!, Has Cable Television Ended rhe 
Golden Era of Presidential Television, 93 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 99 ( 1999). 
54. TIMOTHY COOK, GOVERNlNG WITH THE NEWS ( 1998). 
55. See Cass R. Su nstein, Bad lncelllives and Bad Jnstillltions, 86 GEO. L.J. 2267 (1998). 
56. MARTIN P. WATTENBURG, THE RISE OF CANDIDATE-CENTERED POLITICS 66 ( 1991 ). 
57. !d. at 66-91. 
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I I I .  THE I M PACT OF T H E  WATERGATE REFORMS 
Th i s  leads ,  of course,  to the s i xty-four thousand dol l ar quest ion:  in this  
changed environment, how do the Watergate reforms i mpact the presidency 
poli t ica l ly? Regardless of whether these changes are appropriate legally, do 
presidents and their staff have di fficulty withstanding scrutiny even when they 
are trying, and have every i ncenti ve, to do their job properly. In other words, 
by making the president and his staff subj ect to many more sub stantive restric­
t ions and i ncreasing exponentia l ly the pol it ical and legal scrutiny of the ir  
compliance, have we created systemic costs  to the presidency'� Whatever 
one ' s  ult i mate conclusion, there are several reasons, I think, to be raise ques­
t ions .  
First ,  the modern presidency i s  largely uni tary. This  means that  the White 
H o u se and cabinet make, oversee, or are simply thought by the public to over­
see, a very high proportion of the decisions of government. As a res u l t ,  the 
White House is going to be involved i n ,  or held responsible for, more dec i ­
sions that are subject t o  some type o f  legal regulation o r  ethical charge, even i f  
the pres ident may never have been actually involved. As anyone who has 
worked in  the White House will tell you, they often make s u ch decisions in a 
matter of minutes and only realize the potential legal issues or problems until  
after a charge has subsequently arisen .  On other occasions, they are c harged 
with responsibil ity for decisions which they did not themselves make but for 
which they had oversight responsibility.  As  a s imple matter of mathematics, 
therefore, there are many more possibilit ies for legal error, violations of com­
plicated conflict  of interest standards ,  or s i mple suspicions of i mproper be­
havior, all of which may be subject to subsequent legal or press  micro scrutiny. 
Second, this effect is complic ated by the incentive members of the White 
House sometimes have to shave i t  close to the legal l ine ,  especially if they are 
going to be politically successful. Watergate revealed the need to extend the 
rule  of law to more decisions of our political system. Yet, there is an i nherent 
tension between pol i tics  and law. The main reason is our inherently ambigu­
ous view on what we consider appropriate political  representation:  we believe 
in  B urkean representation as well as constituency service,  but not in i llegal 
bribes or selling government opportu ni ties. 59 While Daniel B oorstin has called 
a certain level of moral ambigui ty the "genius  of A merican politics,"60 i t  
makes i t  difficult  to be a s uccessfu l  politician i n  an open, h ighly contentious,  
59. Daniel Hayes Lowenste in ,  Political Bribery and the Intermediate Theon' of Politics, 3 2  
UCLA L.  REV. 784 ( 1 985). See also David A .  Strauss, What is the Goal of Campaign Finance 
Reform. 1995 U .  C H I .  LEGAL F. 141; and B ruce E .  Cain, Moralism and Realism in Campaign 
Finance Reform, 1 995 U. C H I .  LEGAL F. I l l .  For a recent j udicial example  of this ambiguity.  
see Unired Srares v. Sun-Diamond Growers, 67 U .S .L. W. 5265 (Apr.  27,  1 999) (outl ining legal 
requirements for establ ishing acceptance of an i l legal gratuity under 18 U .S . C .  � 20 1 (c)( l ) (A)) .  
60. D/1NIEL J.  BOORSTI:--1. THE A �·IE R ICANS 39 1 -430 (1967). 
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legal l y  regulated environment. The margins between confl ict  of i nterest and 
appropriate polit ical representations, between quid pro quo bri bes and pol itical 
deals, between legitimate c la ims of secrecy and obstruction of just ice, between 
soft and hard money, between issue ads and presidential ads, between down­
p l aying uncomfortable detai l s  and lying to the pub l i c ,  are al l quite narrow .  In­
deed, the distinctions may u l t imately turn on the political perspective of the 
beholder. At some point, every successful president and his aids have an in­
centi ve to push th is behavior close to the l ine .  But in an environment where 
these l i nes are often defined by the criminal law, and where the pub l i c  is un­
l ikely to appreciate thi s  moral amb iguity in the l ight of intense ex posr facto 
press coverage and microscopic independent counsel investigations, the con­
sequences can be substantial .6 1 
This tension was brought home to thi s  author years ago from comments 
made by career Justice Department l awyers about the difference between the 
Car1er and Reagan White Houses. The Carter people, who were steeped in the 
lore of Watergate, sought a legal opin ion  before undertaking any in i ti ative and, 
as a result, never did anything, according to my informants . The Reaganites, 
who were not well l iked by my confidants because of their polit ics, were nev­
ertheless generally  praised for thei r  wi l l ingness to exercise leadership, that is , 
take chances, and at least get something done. 
Of course, the Reagan and Clinton White Houses paid a price-that is the 
point. Some recent examples from today ' s  headlines: President Clinton and 
the First Lady' s  i nvolvement i n  the travel office firings and file  gate ; i mproper 
campaign calls made by the Vice President and President from the White 
House ; i mproper soft money expenditures on ads for the President; us ing gov­
ernment resources, such as the Lincoln bedroom, to raise money; Cl inton ' s  in­
volvement in the claim of executive priv i lege for the secret service ;  White 
House calls to the Treasury about the Whitewater i nvestigat ion;  H i ll ary Clin­
ton' s  i nvolvement in the health reform commission; the list is endless .  A 
modern White House ' s  oversight of the bureaucracy while pursuing  its polit i­
ca l  agenda i s  frequently going to get i t  i nto legal trouble and subject  it to accu­
sations of political impropriety or sleaziness. I t  i s  a consequence of i ts  unitary 
structure and need to push projects to the l imit ,  all the while being subject to 
intense outside scrutiny .62 
The political problem is magnified,  it should be emphasized, when the le-
6 1 .  For a ful ler d iscussion of the problems of presidents operating in a pol i tical environment 
of moral conf1ict and poli tical ambiguity see Fitts, supra note 2 1 .  See also CRONIN & 
GENOVESE, supra note 38.  
62.  See David von Drehle, Feat of' Henrv C/av, WASHINGTON POST, June 20, 1 993,  at C I .  
( .. Political commentators [continually] assert that President Cl inton compromises are a s ign of his 
complete lack of moral convictions .") ;  Thomas L. Friedman. Clinton 's Cav Policy, N . Y .  TIMES, 
July  25, 1 993 at A 1 1  (criticizing B ush, i n  almost identical terms. ' ·for changing h is  positions so 
many t i mes nobody knows who he is .") 
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gal basis for scrutiny and/or substantive intervention is enforcement of the 
cri minal Ia w. Because of the severe moral e lement imp! ici t in criminal sanc­
t ion, and the diff iculty in applying a nuanced normative judgement appropriate 
to the real polit ical context, there can be very serious pol i t ical effects when ac­
cusations of criminal i mpropriety are raiscd 6' In a pol itical ly charged atmos­
phere of imperfect information, it can be the equivalent of a death sentencc 6-l 
Thi s  l eads to the final and re lated reason why these changes may impact 
on the presidency:  the nature and source of i ts  strength, informal polit ical sup­
port and control over the pol i t ical agenda. As I noted, the public views the 
president as "above poli tics" and a unique source of "moral leadership." As 
George Reedy observed, "the president affords the only means through which 
we can act as a nation."65 As a result, ' ·publ i c  opinion polls show that the 
public most cons is tently expect the president to place  the country's interests 
above that of politics. Presidents must present themselves as representatives of 
the people and as moral, non-partisan, and re l igious leaders."66 
These expectations, however, cause problems for a modern president 
seeking to push the political envelope, engage in political compromise and 
deals, but who is subject to extraordinary micro legal and press scrutiny of h is  
actions in the wake of  Watergate . An actual criminal investigation exacer­
bates this  tension; not only does the independent counsel have a s tructural in­
centive to uncover every detail, but the strategic behavior of l i tigation, as 
presidential lawyer David Kendell  has recently learned, does not play well on 
the modern presidency stage. It is no accident that the public and press repeat­
edly charge modern presidents with "lacking moral conviction," being "sl ick" 
or "tricky," as "changing positions so many times nobody knows who [they 
are] ,"or as treating issues "compartmental ly," to quote just a few of the recent 
allegations. Unfortunately ,  these qualities, while  not exactly sought after in a 
spouse or religious advisor, may be valuable to the exercise of leadership in 
this environment. 67 
63. See generally Edwin M .  Yoder. The Presidencr and rhe Criminali:arion of Polirics, 43 
ST. LOUIS U. L.J . 7 49 ( 1999). See also John Griesbach, Three Le1•e!s of" Trouble: A Commenr on 
Edwin Yoder 's " The Presidency and rlze Criminali:orion of Polirics ",  43 ST . LOUIS U. L .J . 761 
( 1 999).  
6 4. Of course, the i ncreasing legalization of government i s  true at  all  levels .  Government 
officials are necessari ly i nvolved in more activit ies and subject to more i n vestigation and prose­
cution than ever before. See Ornstein ,  supra note I 0. 
65. GEORGE E .  REEDY, THE TWILIGHT OF THE PRESI DENCY ( 1 970) 
66. LYN RAGSDALE, ViTAL STATISTICS ON THE PRESIDENCY ( 1996). 
67. Not surpris ingly.  several of the recent conspicuous exercises of leadership have occurred 
outside the public view . For example, Presidential commissions that act i n  pri vacy.  such as the 
missile base closi ng com miss ion and the social security commission,  have tended to be more suc­
cessful than open committees subject to FACA. such as the health care com mission. The point is 
that politics someti me� means making deals and managi ng. or h i ding ,  information and resolv ing 
conflict behind c losed doors . One final observation : i t  i s  i mportant to  recogn ize that th i s  loss o f  
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I V .  CONCLUSION 
Let me quickly offer some brief, but obvious. c aveat:-; to the above analy-
S I S .  
First ,  despite the concerns out l i ned here ,  presidents have and  w i l l  survive 
most scrutin y .  Ronald Reagan.  for example, inoculated h imse lf  from some of 
these problems s imply by appearing, and being, un involved with many of  the 
detai l s  of government- a non-unitary unitary president. He die! l ose control 
of the policy agenda in his second term, and several of his a ids  were prose­
cuted, but his Presidenc_Y u l t imately survi ved the chal lenge 6s 
Cl inton · s  pol i t ical response to scandal represents a more compl i cated 
case. especia l ly  in  l ight of the Monica Lewinsky episode . The type of personal  
transgressions found in the Lewinsky affair fal l  outside the current analysis ,  
which focuses on the exerc ise of government powers. Nevertheless ,  C l inton 
has been more res i l ient pol itical l y  than many origina l ly predi cted.69 At the 
t ime this a11ic le  went to press,  despi te i mpeachment by the House, C l i nton st i l l  
had extremely h igh j ob approval rat ings .  The type of personal scandal at i ssue 
in this episode, al though different from the transgressions d iscussed in  this ar­
t ic le ,  seems not to have tainted this  pres ident ' s  overal l level of pol i t ica l  sup­
port. 
At the same t ime. whether h i s  presidency stands as a prototype for future 
pol i tical  leaders facing ethics investigations remains to be seen .  Cl i nton ' s  per­
sonal approval  rat ings. and control over the pol icy agenda, h ave evaporated 
during the scandal . He has also benefi ted from crime rates p lummeting and an 
economy performing at h istorica l ly unprecedented levels ,  a social  and eco­
nomic environment future presidents are unlikely to enjoy. In  short ,  the expe­
ri ences of C l inton, l ike those of Reagan and Bush .  suggest there is a po l i t ical 
cost. though the presidencies u ltimately survive. 
My second caveat: the analys is  does not i mply that we should  repea l  the 
l aws and rely s imply on polit ical retribution to keep the president in check.. 
Whi le  we may argue about how tight the scrut iny should be, Watergate re­
vealed the need to hold pres idents and their staffs subject to legal  oversight .  
Indeed, a cutback i n  the I ndependent Counsel Law, which seems inevitable at 
this point ,  may solve many of the proble ms, so l ong as i t  i s  accompanied by 
su pport for the president c a n  infect the entire branch. Because the executive branch is  largely 
unitary. the president cannot recuse himself  from decisions or be replaced if  the heat gets too 
high.  lndeed. even if he rides out the storm. the allegations can e flect the entire institution. His 
public approval tends to ,·acillate . a variability over time that can itse l f  undermine the ins t i tu t i o n .  
even if h e  i s  technically successful in defe nding against a specific charge .  
68.  Reagan also l o s t  control o f  t h e  policy agenda during his second te rm. Sl'e RAGSD,\LE. 
supm note 66. at 232-37 .  
69.  See John R .  Zaller. JV!nnicu Le11 ·insk Y 's  Conrri/)J{rion To Po/iriwl Science. 3 1  POL  .. SCI .  
& POL.  1 82 ( I  ()9 8 ) .  
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greater publ i c  and congressional  recogn i tion  that we may have gone too far. i n  
other words . a change i n  the post-Watergate norms o f  the pre s i denc y .  
Final ly .  the general i ty of  the argument i s  not in tended t o  mask any pol i t i ­
c a l  age nda for or agai nst a particular pres ident,  b u t  rather t o  avoid obsessing 
on a part icular  admini stration or legal  device.  The author was ori g i nal ly  h ired 
by the Carter adminis trat ion,  served in the Reagan admini stration.  and has 
c lose friends who have worked in the B ush and C l inton adm i n i strations.  From 
what I can tell as an outs i de observer, there has been i l legal behav i o r  in all of 
these administrations,  as one would e xpect.  
Despite these i mportant l imi tations.  we sti l l  need to appreciate the cost o f  
thi s dynamic process.  I n  the ent ire debate over the I ndependent Counsel law. 
executi ve pri v i lege,  and hei ghtened oversight of the presidency,  opponents 
have fai led to address one s i mple question:  why can ' t  the president and his 
staff w i thstand the legal and pol i tical scrut iny if in  fact they are doing the ir  
duties .  While several scholars attribute the  problem s i mply to  a c u l tural obses­
sion w i th scandal , there seems to be something pecul i ar to the office of  the 
pres idency that is i mportant. Why is the pol i t ics  of scandal seem to be so 
costly i f  we are s i mp l y  ensuring there w i l l  not be corruption at the very highest 
level of our government, the pres idency. 
This art i c l e  has sought to offer one explanat ion.  Over the long run, micro 
scrutiny can expose the president ' s  necessary but  highly undignified pol i t ical  
act ivit ies.  obfuscation on i ssues,  avoidance of pol i tica l  cont1ict ,  and proximity 
to concei v ably i l legal  conduct,  even if he i s  generall y  trying to do h i s  job.  B y  
making one person the focus of  branch a n d  government power (that i s ,  b y  fur­
thering a u n itary presidency),  we create expectations of president ial perform­
ance and pol i ti c al resolut ion that can be pract ical ly (even at t imes logical l y )  
i mpossible .  More i mportantly,  i l l u mj nating with obsess ive c l arity the comp l i ­
cated tactics of a president attempting t o  operate i n  thi s  environ ment can have 
an i mportant pol i t ical  i mpact, even i f  there i s  no u n derlyi n g  i l legal behavior .  
I f  this  analy s i s  i s  correct, therefore, at least  some of our crit ic i s ms of current 
presidents may be a function of their operat ing in this environment,  not s i mply 
thei r  personal fai l i ngs .  Even B ob Woodward, a strong supporter of those 
changes, has conceded that conflicts i n  presidential rol e .  He recently w rote : 
The myth of the big-t ime president pers ists,  the longing for some­
one with heroic energy, someone who can take the air out of a room, 
who can define an era worth l i ving in. That is not only what Presidents 
hope to see in themselves,  i t  i s  what the public wants and what the 
Pres ident holds up as the standard against which they w i l l  be j udged. 
But the post-Watergate conditions have made the e mergence o f  such a 
leader i ncreas i ngly unlikely . . .  70 
70.  B O B  WOODWA R D .  S H ,c\ DOW: FIVE PRES! l)ENTS A N D  THF. LEGA.CY Of' W.-\TERG.-\ TE ) I )  
( 1 999 ) .  
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This phenomenon can have two real consequences .  On the one hand, if, as 
presidential scholars suggest,  the presidency serves as the symbol of our coun­
try, we can expect to have i nterm i t tent national identity cr ises . We don ' t  l ike 
some presidents, and if Freud is  r ight, perhaps ourse lves .  in  part because o f  the 
j ob they must do and the character traits i t  demands. Thi s  weakness  is not p re­
ordai ned, but i s  more l i ke l y .  At i ts extreme, thi s  type of cyni c i s m  among e lites 
in Washi ngton and perhaps the publ ic  at l arge mjght even have an effect  on a 
soc i al and economic commodity.  social  t rust ,  whose i mportance Robert Put­
nam and others have underscored.  
But  there may be a more fundamental structural issue.  As a resu l t  of th is  
process, Pres idents may be weaker pol i t ica l ly  and less able  to  overcome the 
pol it ical  gridlock created by our system of checks and balances and superma­
j ori ty rules .  Again, this outcome is not preordai ned, but  is probably  more 
l i kely .  
Of course, if  one concl udes that the current level  of frict ion has posit ive 
v alue,  as the Framers bel ieved,  then this  outcome is  benefic ial . But to the ex­
tent one views the presidency as a necessary engine for i nnovation and l e ader­
ship,  as the original  supporters of the modern presidency d i d ,  there may be 
reason for more substantive concern. I n  the end, only history, i n formed by to­
day ' s  events in Washington and yet to be written, w i l l  g i ve us  a more defi n i ­
tive answer. 
